This paper revisits the resilience of the ASEAN region to external shocks amidst the unfolding effects of the US-China trade war. It investigates and compares the effects of regional (ASEAN) and global (US, China) shocks on ASEAN-5 using a structural VAR framework. To identify the propagation of economic shocks and spillovers on ASEAN-5, the changing trade links between the economies considered are used to account for time variations spanning the period 1978Q1 to 2018Q2. Three major results follow from the analyses on trade links and output multiplier effects. First, the response of ASEAN-5 to shocks from the US and China were more pronounced than regional shocks for the period after the Asian financial crisis. Second, the increasing cumulative impact of China's shock on ASEAN was congruous to the growing trade links and trade intensities between ASEAN and China. Third, the US and China were dominant growth drivers for the weaker trade-linked ASEAN partners. Taken together, the results suggest that global shocks matter for the region, and the economic resilience of the region to global shocks depends on indirect effects, apart from the direct trade links.
Introduction
The United States-China trade war that began in January 2018 has raised the stakes for trade and economic growth in Southeast Asia. This is because Southeast Asia is an integral part of production networks, particularly in electronics, in which China, ASEAN's single largest trading partner, occupies a nodal position (Huang, Salike & Zhong, 2017) . The Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a region is dependent on third markets, such as the United States (US), through its trade with China (Prana, 2018) . Through supply chains, ASEAN is affected by the trade wars as the top ten US imports from China facing increased tariffs include segments of the electronics industry, such as telecommunications equipment, computer circuit boards and processing units (Thomas, 2019) . As such, de-globalization following from the American-Sino trade war could rupture the triangular trade patterns that prevail between ASEAN, China and the US.
Notwithstanding the above, there are optimistic accounts that trade will bring about some strategic and positive consequences for the region, such as trade diversions from three perspectives: China to ASEAN; US to ASEAN; and ASEAN to other ASEAN member states (AMS). The trade war, apparently, is already causing the shifting of supply chains (Tobin & Power, 2019) , namely the relocation of lower value-added activities to countries like Vietnam (Thomas, 2019) , and the surge in exports of components from China to ASEAN (Yeo, 2018) . Moeller (2018) adds that the repercussions on overall economic growth in Southeast Asia from this trade war will be minimal when compared with the crises episodes, the Asian financial crisis (AFC) in 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis (GFC) in [2008] [2009] . Others argue, however, that any positive effects from the trade war for the region would be short-term (Anya, 2019) , as the war could escalate beyond the US and China.
Against this speculative debate of the unfolding effects of the trade war, the resilience of the ASEAN region to the direct 1 and indirect 2 shocks from the US-China trade war is called into question. Moeller (2018) believes that for Southeast Asia, the indirect impact of the trade war will be more relevant and interesting to be analyzed. With the nature of ASEAN's interdependent trade with the two superpowers, the ongoing US-China trade war is an important global shock to be considered when debating the economic resilience of the region.
In this regard, the impact on the ASEAN Member States ( This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant literature on trade interdependencies and its quantification. Section 3 describes the changing patterns of trade (export integration, trade intensity and trade balance) for the ASEAN-5 (five founding members -Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia), China and the US in bilateral relationships. Section 4 details the data, methodology and estimation procedures.
Section 5 presents the empirical results and discusses the findings, and Section 6 concludes.
Theory and Empirics
Bilateral trade is an important source for inter-country business cycle linkages (Baxter & Kouparitsas, 2004; Imbs, 2004; Cheewatrakoolpong & Manprasert, 2014) . Increasing trade links may therefore lead to co-movements and increased volatility as they induce large demandside (contraction, expansion, substitution) effects. In the presence of production networks, the emphasis on common global (external) shocks is understandable, as the effects of the shocks can be transmitted indirectly (Cheewatrakoolpong & Manprasert, 2015; Sato & Shrestha, 2014) through induced changes in domestic production and trade in intermediate goods (parts and components or indirect trade). For example, the current US-China trade war is expected to cause a realignment of global supply chains in the ASEAN region (Tobin & Power, 2019) .
Arguably, the transmission of shocks to networked economies, in turn, can magnify the global shocks.
The extant literature on trade interdependencies are largely based on formal modelling approaches, while some others are done in an off-model manner. Formal modelling approaches include the computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to create different scenarios of shocks and identify their potential global economic impacts (Bollen & Rojan-Romagosa, 2018; Guo, Lu, Sheng & Yu, 2018) , and global input-output tables that examine shock transmissions in terms of intermediate inputs (Sato & Shrestha, 2014) . Econometric models, in turn, such as the SVAR and global VAR (GVAR) methods, are used to examine shocks according to impulse response function analyses.
Following from the different methods used, the empirical literature on the trade channel 4 as a transmission mechanism for propagating shocks across countries, however, remains at best mixed (Dungey, Khan & Raghavan, 2018) . Several studies find a moderate or weak role for trade interdependence in propagating economic shocks (Canova, 1991; Canova & Dellas, 1993; Masson, 1998; Baig & Goldfajn, 1999; Harrigan, 2000; Blanchard, Das and Faruqee, 2010; Berkmen, Gelos, Rennhack & Walsh, 2012) . Alternatively, studies by Dungey and Martin (1998), Ito and Hashimoto (2005) , Haidar (2012) and Dungen et al. (2018) identify that trade (both bilateral and competition via a third market) had some influence in explaining the propagation of instabilities and output shocks in the international markets (see also Sato and Shrestha, 2014) .
Previous studies on the interdependence of trade (and income) in the context of the ASEAN region also do not provide any robust findings. While Lau (2008) concludes that ASEAN-5 and China are subject to common shocks, Yuning and Junyi (2016) observe that ASEAN-5 has become less integrated with China in terms of the growth rate after the GFC. This is supported by other studies that suggest a stronger regional influence of the US relative to China (Sato, Zhang, & McAleer, 2011; Feldkircher & Korhonen, 2014 , Sato & Shrestha, 2014 Dungey and Vehbi, 2015) . On the contrary, Abeysinghe and Lu (2013) and Ong and Sato (2018) find multiplier effects of China on the regional economies. Ong and Sato (2018) show that Asia (including ASEAN-5) is affected by a China shock relative to a US shock, and with the exception for Malaysia and the Philippines, the remaining ASEAN-5 members are also positively affected by a shock from China.
The conflicting findings justify a revisit to the issue of trade interdependence in the context of ASEAN, a group that is regionally networked, yet highly integrated with the global economy. The trade channel is also more relevant for ASEAN, relative to monetary and financial shocks.
Trade Patterns: ASEAN5, China and the US
The direct export exposure of ASEAN-5 to the markets of China and the US was 12.99 per cent and 9.62 per cent in 2018, respectively (calculated from ITC, 2019). The AMS, however, recorded varying degrees of integration with the region, China and the US. [Insert Figure 3 here]
Data and Methodology
The database contains gross domestic product (GDP) growth and export share series 5 of Output growth rates are first differences of log real GDP, where the X-12 procedure is applied when seasonal adjustment is required. The unit root tests of GDP growth series support the conclusion that the GDP growth series are stationary. To measure bilateral-trade flows, a trade-matrix (W) 8 is constructed with 12-quarter moving average export data, which results in a smooth varying W matrix, reducing noise in the data (see also Abeysinghe & Forbes, 2005) .
To examine the interdependence between each of the ASEAN economies with China the US and other ASEAN economies, we estimate a SVAR 9 model employing quarterly data on GDP and export shares.
A SVAR model representation is:
where is a (4 × 1) vector of variables, the ( = 0, 1, 2, ⋯ , ) are (4 × 4) matrices of coefficients with 0 normalised across the main diagonal. is the (4 × 1) vector of constants while is a (4 × 1) multivariate white noise error process with zero mean and a diagonal covariance matrix, containing the variances of the structural disturbances. The in (1) The SVAR framework enables us to capture both direct and indirect interdependencies via trade links between the two larger economies and the regional economies, observed through changing trade weights over time on each of the ASEAN economies. This approach allows for the analysis of the impact of output shocks originating from China, the US and the ASEAN region with different configurations of international trade links and illustrates how the propagation of shocks changes over time due to the transforming trade structure.
The SVAR in (1) can be represented as:
where ( ) is a matrix polynomial in lag operator and ( ) = 0 − 1 − ⋯ − and
The disturbances, , have economic meaning and therefore the effects of shocks originating from China ( , ), the US ( , ) and the ASEAN ( , ) on each of the economies are captured effectively by the impulse response functions given in (3):
The impulse responses enable us to disentangle the impacts of a shock in one economy on another, highlighting the prevailing bilateral cross-border interdependencies. We compute impulse responses to illustrate how a shock to an individual country has a direct and indirect influence on other countries in the sample through trade-links and output-multiplier effects.
Results and Discussion
In this section we present the impulse responses for the ASEAN-5 economies to demonstrate the dynamic nature of transmission mechanism of a country-specific shock. This is followed by estimates of the output multipliers to assess the direct and indirect effects of the regional and global shocks. Since the overall period of study, 1978Q1 to 2018Q2, includes the post liberalization period in ASEAN-5 economies, and the AFC and the GFC, the timeframe of the analysis is further divided into three sub-periods to account for the pre-and post-crises, as reported in Table 1 . We selected these sub-periods to examine the possible changes in international transmission mechanism with changes in the cross-border trade links among countries over time.
[Insert Table 1 here] Figure 4 presents the impulse responses of each ASEAN-5 economies to a one-unit growth shock originating in the US, China and the ASEAN region respectively for the four sample periods described in Table 1 . Figure 4 shows that in the full sample period, the responses of each of the ASEAN-5 economies to one-unit shock from the ASEAN region are larger than those from the US or China, and they generally peak around the second quarter and [Insert Figure 4 here] However, when we breakdown the sample into the pre-and post-AFC periods, different patterns emerge, which justify the sub-period analyses to capture the bilateral trade relationships that have evolved and matured (see also Figure 1 ). In the pre-AFC period, the shock originating from the ASEAN region had a larger and significant effects on these economies, while shocks from the US and China produced relatively smaller effects. This implies, in the pre-AFC crisis period, the regional economic conditions were more important for these economies and they were less affected by conditions in the US or China.
Alternatively, in the post-AFC period, particularly before the GFC period, the shock originating from the US had a more dominant impact on Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, while the shocks from China and the region (except for Malaysia) generated somewhat similar effects across all the economies. Extending the period beyond the GFC, it was observed while the pattern of responses did not change that much, there was a slight decline in the intensity of the responses, partly due to the slowdown in global economic activity.
Overall, the effects from both the US and China increased in the post-AFC period, implying the region's growing connectivity with the world's two largest economies. This is not surprising as China's integration into the regional production networks only took off after its entry to the World Trade Organization in 2001 (Huang, Salike & Zhong, 2017) . Table 2 [Insert Table 2 and the asymmetric responses have important policy implications.
Concluding Remarks
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Appendix Figure 1: Export Shares with ASEAN, 1978Q1-2018Q
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